

Canadians for Justice and Peace
in the Middle East



Chapter Summary: Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid

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Chapter 1: Prospects for Peace

- Carter has a life goal of ensuring a lasting peace for Israel and its neighbours
- Sees growing challenges:
 - Growing Arab animosity with Israeli-American alliance
 - Growing schism between Sunni and Shia Muslims through Iraq strife
 - Militant groups gaining influence through their fight against Israeli occupation
 - No viable peace initiatives; no pressure from Washington for Peace
- Continuing impediments
 - Some Israelis want to take Palestinian land
 - Some Arabs don't want to give territorial recognition of Israel
 - Israel won't accept the Palestinian leadership
 - Both sides impose impossible preconditions to negotiations
 - Religious fundamentalism
 - Lack of US effort to pursue peace based on international law and previous agreements ratified by Israel
- Sees signs of hope
 - Civilian populations on all side earnestly want peace
- There are three premises of any peace deal:
 - Israel must have territorial recognition by its neighbours
 - The killing of Israeli, Palestinian and Lebanese noncombatants must not be accepted
 - Palestinians must be allowed to live in peace and dignity in their own land as defined by international law, unless modified by good-faith negotiations with Israel

Chapter 2: My First Visit to Israel

- Carter was invited to Israel in 1973, when he was governor of Georgia
- Impressions of Israel were numerous
 - Found Israelis very self-assured about their military strength, given their military success in 1967
 - Realized that Israel was a highly diverse society, with deep religious and political distinctions
 - Assumed that Israel was only holding on to the occupied Territories so that it could return them in exchange for peace
 - Recognized the harshness of the Palestinian dispossession, but assumed that Palestinians would have their own state, and be compensated in the future
 - Assumed that the Palestinian population was quiet mostly because their rights were being protected
- 1973 War was a big surprise for Israelis
 - Israelis caught by surprise
 - Global war was almost initiated when US and Soviet Union almost came into conflict when Israel crossed the Suez Canal and advance on Cairo. Nuclear arms of US and Soviet Union put on high alert for the only time in history

Chapter 3: My Presidency

- Condition in the US
 - When Carter was president, the US was not talking to PLO until it recognized Israel and accepted Res. 242, thus confirming Israel's existence within pre-1949 borders
 - US policy was based on 242 (1967) and 338 (1973)
 - Carter (1977) shocked many people in the 1970s, saying "There has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many, many years."
- In Egypt and Israel
 - Sadat very optimistic for peace, and open to negotiate – wanted an deal encompassing Egypt and Palestinians
 - Begin had won Israeli election claiming that Gaza and WB must be retained by Israel. However, seemed willing to negotiate
 - US-Israel relationship strained as Israel invades Lebanon with US weapons (including cluster bombs) following a terror attack on Israel which killed 35. Carter threatens, Israel withdraws, UNIFIL established.
- Camp David Accords
 - Begin wanted to discuss Sinai more than WB&G. However, both sides agreed to honour UNSC 242 and 338; Israelis agreed to withdraw from WB&G
 - Sadat insisted on self-determination for Palestinians, and "everyone was convinced that these rights had been protected in the final document"
 - "...most serious omission of the Camp David talks was the failure to clarify in writing Begin's verbal promise concerning the settlement freeze"
 - After the Camp David Accords, "Israel removed Egypt's considerable strength from the military equation of the Middle East, and thus it permitted itself renewed freedom to... confiscate, settle and fortify the occupied territories."



Chapter 4: The Key Players (The Palestinians) Chapter 5: Other Neighbours

- History of Palestine and Palestinians and Israelis
 - Provides history as well as demographic progression and land percentages in Palestine
 - Points out that 1948 created Palestinian 700,000 refugees, and 1967 caused 320,000 refugees (Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Palestine)
 - Jewish nationalism in Europe
 - Ongoing war and subsequent occupation with Middle East neighbours simply has exacerbated the fear, hatred and alienation among them
 - Israel has always managed to dominate its neighbours; during most military engagements, Arab casualties have been 3-4 times greater than that of their adversaries
- Review of the founding and purpose of the PLO
 - Definition of the PLO, as provided by Arafat to Carter: "...It is the institutional expression of Palestinian nationhood..."
- Other Neighbours
 - Syria: Carter brings attention to occupied Golan; talks about Assad's opinion that Israelis are expansionist, and how they create excuses to expand and occupy new land; talks about how Assad never forgave Sadat for making an independent peace, and putting more pressure on Israel's other neighbours
 - Noted how Bashar Al-Assad was not given a visa to New York for UN meeting
 - History of Jordan's creation, its annexation of West Bank in 1949, accepted by the Palestinians, and its struggle to integrate 400,000 Palestinian refugees among a native 200,000 population
 - Respect for Sadat. Notes the disillusionment of many Egyptians that Israel has not respected the full implications of the 1978 peace accords, and still seeks to expand
 - Lebanon, Hezbollah: Carter acknowledges that since 1924, Shabaa Farms considered Lebanese
 - Saudi Arabia: Influential for its oil wealth and home of Muslim holy sites; most recent significant move was the 2002 proposal for peace adopted by the Arab League



Chapter 6: The Reagan Years, 1981-1989

- Lots of quick changes after Carter left office
 - Israel bombs Iraqi nuclear reactor, annexes the Golan Heights, and accelerates construction of colonies in the WB&G
 - Israel invades Lebanon in 1982. Israel succeeds in driving the PLO out of Lebanon, but PLO later still emerges as the nationalist movement of the Palestinians
 - Carter assists Reagan administration to craft a speech, which states, "It is the United States' position that -- in return for peace -- the withdrawal provision of Resolution 242 applies to all fronts, including the West Bank and Gaza
 - In 1986, it is revealed that Israeli intermediaries were involved in selling weapons to Iran for the release of US hostages being held in Lebanon, with the money being used to support the Contra war in Nicaragua
 - In late 1987, the first intifada erupts due to increased Likud colonization of the WB&G
- Encountering Israel again – as a private citizen
 - Begin unwavering, as Carter challenged him as to why he had not honoured the commitments made vis-à-vis the WB&G in the peace accords. Carter not happy about the growing colonies
 - Carter observed that Israel had become more tense – more militant; soldiers seen everywhere
 - Israelis dismissive of Reagan attempts for peace through George Schultz
 - Carter observed that none of Israel's wars had resolved the two basic sources of continuing conflict: land and Palestinian rights
 - Dialog in Israeli society seemed more tense, and people more polarized. Two Israels were emerging, and increased militancy on both Israeli and Arab sides seemed inevitable

Chapter 7: My visits with Palestinians

- After his presidency, Carter tried to meet with Palestinians whenever he could
 - Noted that he found them all over the world; was impressed by the lawyers who were active in defending Palestinian rights; noted how Palestinians were interested in having the international community document their grievances; noted that Palestinians were both Muslim and Christian
 - Relates B'Tselem reports of how Palestinian rights are regularly not respected, e.g. via home demolitions; travel restrictions; illegal detention, interrogation and trial conditions; etc.
 - Relates how he tried to encourage Palestinians to appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court, but how it was made impossible: e.g. the expense was too great; or how Palestinians were tried under military courts; or, if they won, new administrative measures were implemented to accomplish the same Israeli goal
 - Relates how Israeli officials would prevent aid from getting to Palestinians
 - Described the extreme situation which exists in Hebron
- Description of the Israeli colonization of the WB&G
 - Details Israel's mechanisms to confiscate land, and make life unbearable for the Palestinians under occupation

Chapter 8: The George H.W. Bush Years

Chapter 9: The Oslo Agreement

- Chapter 8: The George H.W. Bush Years
 - In 1988, Jordan phased out its role in the West Bank, forcing the hands of the Israelis.
 - Arafat also publicly disavowed violence as a means to his goal
 - The Cold War came to a close, allowing former superpowers to cooperate
 - James Baker pushed for asked the pro-Israel lobby to “forswear annexation” and “Stop settlement activity.” Such statements encouraged the Arab regimes. Baker also condemned Israeli colonization of Palestine, and even withheld loans to Israel on this issue.
 - Prior to the first Gulf War, the Bush administration
- Chapter 9: The Oslo Agreement
 - Carter pointed out how Arafat had failed to obtain specific concessions concerning a timetable for Israel’s withdrawal from the OPT.
 - Oslo made the PA responsible for many things, but gave them very little authority to perform their mandate.
 - Rabin pointed out that he had: 1) established complete Israeli jurisdiction over colonies; 2) established total freedom of movement of the Israeli Army; 3) avoided using the term “withdraw” anywhere, and 4) freed the Israeli Army from maintaining order in the OPT.
 - Oslo allowed Israel to shed all formal responsibility for the living conditions in the OPT



Chapter 10: The 1996 Elections

Chapter 14: The Palestinian Election, 2005

Chapter 15: Palestinian & Israeli Elections, 2006

- Chapter 10: The 1996 Elections
 - Carter Center helped out with this first election after Oslo – the election was a huge challenge given the inexperience of the Palestinians, and the need to conduct elections under occupation
 - Carter was critical of Arafat for stifling the news media and human rights activists.
 - Despite complications, some with Israelis, election went as well as could be expected.
- Chapter 14: The Palestinian Election, 2005
 - Election forced by death of Arafat.
 - Sharon was preparing for Gaza withdrawal, with the intent of moving the colonists to the Negev
 - Carter saw election of Abbas as a good thing: the Israelis/Americans would have the partner they wanted, and Abbas was respected by the Palestinians. Encouraged Americans and Israelis to give Abbas their full support
- Chapter 15: Palestinian and Israeli Elections, 2006
 - With Sharon in a coma, Olmert seemed intent on unilateral action based on the Wall. While Kadima positions itself as a centrist movement, Sharon and Olmert had always refused to adopt the Road Map.
 - Carter attributes Abbas’ loss to allegations of corruption and Israeli and American unwillingness to move negotiations forward with him



Chapter 11: Bill Clinton's Peace Efforts

- Palestinian violence in 1996 precipitated the election of Netanyahu over Peres in Israel. Netanyahu became Israel's PM and pledged never to exchange land for peace. Netanyahu's Foreign Minister (Sharon) heavily promoted the expansion of colonies.
- Netanyahu's government postponed all action on the Wye River Memorandum, which put pressure to reinstate timelines.
- Under Barak (starting in 1999), Israel avoided discussions of commitments under Resolution 242 or Oslo.
- Sharon visited the Temple Mount in September, 2000 and triggered a wave of violence that triggered the Second Intifada.
- The Camp David Accords included some of the following,
 - They would replace all requirements of UN Resolutions that applied to the Middle East.
 - Clinton, not Barak, offered to remove 20 percent of the illegal Israeli colonists, leaving 180,000 in the West Bank and Gaza alone, in 209 colonies
 - Israel would continue to "lease" the land of the Jordan River valley and East Jerusalem.
 - Carter points out that the percentages of territory cited far underestimated the actual control being returned to the Palestinians

Chapter 12: The George W. Bush Years

- Bush came in to office around the same time as Sharon in Israel. Sharon strongly opposed Oslo, and vowed to deal harshly with the Second Intifada
- Carter points out that the 2002 Beirut Summit announcement by the Arab League calling for return to the 1967 borders in return for peace was a big step. White House seemed interested, but Israel destroyed the PA compound in Ramallah the next day.
- Impasse in 2002 led Bush to drive the Road Map Peace Plan. A June, 2002 Security Council resolution called for a sovereign Palestinian state. However, Bush insisted that Arafat would have to be replaced.
- Road Map Peace Plan used Resolutions 242, 338 and 1397 (two-state solution) as a basis. The Palestinians accepted the plan in its entirety. However, Israel had 14 caveats which would have robbed the Plan of any significance. Nonetheless, Bush accepted this as Israeli "buy in" to the plan.
- In June, 2003, Sharon talked about the need for "no unilateral actions" to prejudge future negotiations.

Chapter 13: The Geneva Initiative

- The proposal tried to tackle the three most difficult issues: colonies and permanent borders; the Right of Return of refugees; and Jerusalem
- The Geneva Initiative called for:
 - Secure borders for all
 - A sovereign, contiguous viable state for the Palestinians
 - Recognition by the Arab World of Israel
 - Border would be 1967 border, with land swaps
 - Also details of how to deal with Jerusalem
- Reaction was mixed. Israel and White House were silent, although Colin Powell supported the initiative

Chapter 16: The Wall as a Prison

- Carter says purpose of the Wall is not racism, but “acquisition of land”
- “Withdrawal” from Gaza was the first step, leaving an non-viable entity on its on, circumscribed and isolated.
- The Wall
 - Built entirely within Palestinian territory.
 - Intrudes deeply into Palestinian territory at many points
 - Projected to be 3.5 times as long as Israel’s recognized border with Palestine
 - Puts 375,000 Palestinians on the “Israeli” side of the Wall
 - Isolates Palestinians from their jobs, schools, farms, etc.
 - Qalqilya and Bethlehem are almost entirely encircled by the Wall
 - The path of the Wall is extremely broad with ditches, razor wire, patrol roads, etc.
 - Israel seems poised to annex everything on the “Israeli” side of the Wall, but it will still retain control of the Palestinian side
 - George Bush condemned it: “I think the Wall is a problem.”
 - ICJ ruled in 2004 that the Wall was illegal
 - The Wall also compartmentalizes Palestinian territory into non-viable cantons

Chapter 16: The Wall as a Prison (con't)

- Discussed events of summer of 2006, and condemned US' strong support for Israel's open war on Lebanon and Palestine
- Carter criticizes:
 - Leaders on both sides who ignore strong majorities who crave peace, and allow extremist-led violence to preempt opportunities for political consensus
 - Washington's strange policy that dialogue on controversial issues is a privilege to be extended only as a reward for subservient behavior, and withheld from those who reject US demands.
- Carter believes:
 - Direct engagement with Palestinian leaders, Hamas and Fatah, will be necessary if a negotiated settlement is to be achieved
 - Hamas will agree to a two-state solution, recognition of Israel, and a long-term cease-fire; if this is reciprocated by Israel.
 - Haniyeh's promise, June, 2006: "We have no problem with a sovereign Palestinian state over all our lands within the 1967 borders, living in calm."

Chapter 17: Summary

- Two interrelated obstacles to permanent peace in the Middle East:
 - Some Israelis believe they have the right to confiscate and colonize Palestinian land
 - Some Palestinians react by honouring suicide bombers
- The US has abandoned any peace process. However, the three key requirements for their restarting include:
 - The sovereignty of all Middle East nations and sanctity of international borders must be honoured
 - The security of all peoples – Palestinian and Israeli – must be guaranteed.
 - The internal debate within Israel must be resolved in order to define Israel's permanent legal boundaries.
- The bottom line is this:
 - Peace will come to Israel and the Middle East only when the Israeli government is willing to comply with international law, with the Roadmap for Peace, with official American policy, with the wishes of a majority of its own citizens – and honour its own previous commitments – by accepting its legal borders.
 - All Arab neighbours must pledge to honour Israel's right to live in peace under these conditions.
 - The United States is squandering international prestige and goodwill and intensifying global anti-American terrorism by unofficially condoning or abetting the Israeli confiscation and colonization of Palestinian territories