



Canadians for Justice and Peace  
in the Middle East



# Module 4: International Aid and the Palestine Humanitarian Crisis (Fall, 2006)

September 26, 2006



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# The West Bank and Gaza are in Crisis

*“We are now facing a severe economic crisis in Gaza and the West Bank -- one that risks reversing the combined efforts of the past thirteen years towards a sustainable economy. In fact, a recent World Bank study predicts that, if the current situation continues throughout 2006, this may be the worst year in the Palestinian economic history. The average Palestinian’s personal income will fall by 40%, and 67% of the population will fall into poverty.”*

*A. David Craig*

*World Bank Country Director for West Bank and Gaza*

*September, 2006*



# Agenda

- Predictions for Palestine in May, 2006
- Reality vs. Predictions (high level)
- Overall PA Financing picture
- Aid and humanitarian developments
- Spring Predictions and Fall Reality (low level)
- Canadian Aid to Palestine
- Moral and Legal Concerns with Aid



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# **CJPME's Outlook from Spring, 2006**

# Position of the Canadian Government:

## 1) Shut out the Hamas-led government

Announcement of Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay and International Cooperation Minister Josée Verner (March 29, 2006):

- “The Palestinian Legislative Council has approved the formation of a Hamas-led government,” stated Minister MacKay. “The stated platform of this government has not addressed the concerns raised by Canada and others concerning:
  - non-violence,
  - the recognition of Israel, and
  - acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap for Peace.
- As a result,
  - Canada will have no contact with the members of the Hamas cabinet and
  - [Canada] is suspending assistance to the Palestinian Authority.”
  - “A clear commitment by the Hamas government to the principles that we and the international community have outlined remains an essential precondition for Canada to resume any assistance to the Palestinian Authority.”

# CJPME's predictions in May, 2006

- In May, 2006, meeting 60 MPs, CJPME predicted that the West's stonewalling of the democratically-elected PA would lead to one of three outcomes:
  - 1) Hamas-led PA caves in to pressure
  - 2) Hamas-led PA collapses
  - 3) Hamas-led PA procures "stay alive" funding
- Canadian and Western foreign policy has NOT led to the repudiation of the democratically elected Hamas-led government.
- Canada and the West have simply increased humanitarian suffering.

# Under Scenario 3 above, CJPME had predicted

- Political Implications
  - Increased distrust of Canada and the West, and the perception of a Western double-standard; negation of advances in democracy
  - Hamas position strengthened as sense of self-sufficiency and integrity among Palestinians grows
- Humanitarian Implications
  - Unemployment hits 47 percent, and poverty hits 74 percent <sup>1,2</sup>
  - PA Ministry of Health provides severely limited services, and UN and NGOs can replace only a fraction of PA Ministry of Health Services <sup>3</sup>
  - Violence inhibits humanitarian aid; more Israeli humanitarian abuses <sup>4</sup>
- Diplomatic Implications
  - PA turns away from the West, and is pushed to develop relations with less well-intentioned nations
  - More regionalism – “constructive engagement” less possible
  - Diplomatic guideposts weakened



*March, 2006: Ismail Haniyeh and former PA prime minister Mahmoud Abbas meet to discuss the transition of power.*

<sup>1</sup> The UN defines poverty as living on less than \$2.20 per day

<sup>2</sup> “West Bank and Gaza Economic Update and Potential Outlook,” March 15, 2006, World Bank

<sup>3</sup> “Special Focus: Emerging Humanitarian Risks,” Jan.-Feb., 2006, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)


<sup>4</sup> “Assessment of the future humanitarian risks in the occupied Palestinian territory,” April 11, 2006, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

# MacKay: “Canada will have no contact with the members of the Hamas cabinet”

## Reminder (history of peace players):

### The Palestinians

- Yasser Arafat – founder of the PLO; dismissed as a peace partner; later signed the Oslo Accords



### Israel

- Menachem Begin (Israeli PM) – led the Irgun in terrorism against the British & Palestinians<sup>1,2</sup>
- Yitzhak Shamir (Israeli PM) – led the Stern Gang in terror against the British & others<sup>3,4</sup>
- Likud Party (formed many Israeli gov'ts) – founded by former Jewish terrorists (e.g. Begin, Shamir); highly questioned by international community in 1970s

<sup>1</sup> J. Bowyer Bell, *Terror out of Zion: Irgun Zvai Leumi, Lehi, and the Palestine Underground, 1929-1949*, Avon, 1977,

<sup>2</sup> Menachem Begin, *The Revolt – Memoirs of the Leader of the Irgun*, Dell Books, New York, NY, 1978

<sup>3</sup> Mordechai Gazi, *Israeli Diplomacy & the Middle East Peace Process*, London: Routledge, 2002

<sup>4</sup> Harvey W. Kushner, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, Sage Publications, 2002

*Under the new leadership of Menachem Begin in 1944, the Irgun carried out innumerable attacks on the British, including the infamous bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, which killed 91 British officers, and Arab and Jewish civilians. During Shamir's leadership of the Stern Gang (Lehi), this terrorist group assassinated Britain's Minister of State for the Middle East, Lord Moyne (1944) and the UN Representative to the Middle East, Count Bernadotte (1948) among other acts.*

# MacKay: “Canada will have no contact with the members of the Hamas cabinet”

CJPME does not believe that diplomatic “non contact” has ever been a means to progress

CJPME asks whether non-contact would ever be considered as an approach to the Israelis.



## Reminder (the Hamas-led PA has so far been conciliatory):

- “...this is a good time for peace...”
- “...we will extend our truce...”
- Hamas is inexperienced in running the PA. They will make mistakes

*March 7, 2006- Palestinians pass a watchtower that is part of Israel's controversial Wall, at the Kalandia checkpoint on the way from the West Bank city of Ramallah to Jerusalem. The wall was deemed strictly illegal under international humanitarian law by the International Court of Justice in 2004*

# CJPME Recommendation Page 1:

CJPME perceives all of the above scenarios to be undesirable, for Canadians, Palestinians and Israelis. CJPME proposes three new Canadian strategies:

## Recommendation

- Move to intentional “constructive engagement” with the Hamas-led government, continuing with aid programs, and
- Encourage softened rhetoric and support for peaceful initiatives, and
- Consider emergency humanitarian aid



*Al-Quds University: International grants enabled the School of Medicine to help train Palestinian doctors by co-financing the costs of equipping and operating the school.*

# Reminders: Violence and Middle East Policy

## Reminder (who plays what role):

### The Palestinians

- Occupied
- Violence promulgated by militant groups acting independently
- Military capability non-existent
- Deaths: 3875 <sup>1</sup>
- Injured: 29,465 <sup>2</sup>

### Israel

- Occupier
- Violence promulgated by the Israeli Army, a state-sponsored body, carrying out state-sponsored directives
- Immense military capability, fifth in the world; a nuclear power
- Deaths: 1010 <sup>1</sup>
- Injured: 7590 <sup>3</sup>



<sup>1</sup> Middle East Policy Council, numbers as of April 29, 2006 (since September, 2000)  
<sup>2</sup> Palestinian Red Crescent Society, number as of Feb. 15, 2006 (since September, 2000)  
<sup>3</sup> Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, numbers as of May 3, 2006 (since September, 2000)

*October 26, 2005: In a picture that is all too often a daily occurrence, an Israeli soldier stands guard over detained Palestinian civilians as their identification is checked at a temporary blockade outside of the Hebron University in the West Bank city of al-Khalil (Hebron). These detainees were released after four hours.*



# Is Canada holding the Hamas-led PA and Kadima-led Israel to the same standard?

CJPME supports Canada's view that violence be renounced between the parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

## Current Violence

### Hamas:

- Has held a unilateral ceasefire that it established in December, 2004

## Current Violence

### Israel (ongoing):

- Assassinations
- House demolitions
- Incursions
- Construction of the Wall
- Colonization and colonist violence



# Is Canada holding the Hamas-led PA and Kadima-led Israel to the same standard?

CJPME supports “mutual recognition” - a position where Canada insists that all parties respect the right to self-determination of the other

## Mutual Recognition

### Palestinians:

- Recognized Israel in Oslo Accords (1993)
- Accepted two-state vision established in Road Map Peace Plan as-is

### Hamas:

- Asks what Israel’s borders are.

## Mutual Recognition

### Israel:

- Only recognized the PLO in Oslo Accords
- Rejected key aspects of Palestinian sovereignty in its reservations to the Road Map Peace Plan Israel’s Reservations (slide 41)
- Has never declared its borders
- Sharon’s former (Likud) party: “The Government of Israel flatly rejects the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state west of the Jordan river.” ( Likud Platform, 2006 Elections )

# Is Canada holding the Hamas-led PA and Kadima-led Israel to the same standard?

CJPME believes that Canada should insist on respect for previous agreements, including Oslo I & II, and the Road Map Peace Plan

## Respect for previous agreements

### Fatah-led PA:

- Was unable to fully constrain violence of militant groups
- Did obtain a shaky cease-fire in 2005

### Hamas-led PA:

- Has offered to negotiate if Israel withdraws to 1967 borders (UN Security Council Res. 242)

## Respect for previous agreements

### Israel:

- Has never respected “territorial integrity of the West Bank and Gaza” (Oslo, RMPP)
- Never ceased or slowed colony growth (Oslo, RMPP)
- Never removed colony “outposts” (RMPP)
- Withholds tax transfers (Paris Protocols of Oslo)
- Continues to impose arbitrary labour restrictions on Palestinians (Paris Protocols)

# CJPME Recommendation Page 2:

CJPME supports Canada's

- condemnation of promotion and use of violence
- regard for self-determination and mutual-recognition
- respect for previous agreements and obligations

among parties to the Middle East Conflict.

## Recommendation

- Both Israeli and Palestinian violation of these principles should be censured in a parallel fashion, using an identical standard.
- Canada's standard should be aligned anew with international law.

# Is Canada's Position Rational?

*“Whereas I think that one cannot say that economic growth and economic vitality are of themselves enough to produce a benign political process, one can, however, I think say the opposite, which is that*

*economic desperation, high unemployment, high poverty levels, and a lack of economic dynamism are certainly a fairly good guarantee for social instability and a lack of resolution to these deep-set political issues...*

*...there is no ignoring the importance of the economy if you want something beneficial to happen on the political stage.”*



*Nigel Roberts*

*Former World Bank Country Director  
For the Occupied Palestinian Territory  
February 10, 2006*



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# **The results of Canadian and Western Policies toward the Hamas-led PA**

# Political Results

- Increased distrust of Canada and the West
  - Increased expectation – and response – from Arab League countries and other donors
- Perception of a Western double-standard

*“These pressures have not fostered a desire for compromise on the part of the Government or the people ‘or... the fall of the Government, but rather have created mass despair, anger and a sense of hopelessness and abandonment.’” - UNWRA<sup>1</sup>*
- Negation of advances in democracy
  - Financial reforms and accountability mechanisms are abandoned due to the loss of a banking system, break-down of all but essential services, and unpaid employees<sup>2</sup>
- Hamas position strengthened as sense of self-reliance and “bunker mentality” among Palestinians grows
  - Abbas & Hamas form “unity government” in mid-September when earlier coalition opportunities had been spurned by Abbas and Fatah

<sup>1</sup>“UN Palestine relief agency ready with rehabilitation once conditions improve,” UN Department of Public Information, September 7, 2006

<sup>2</sup>“West Bank and Gaza Update,” World Bank, September, 2006, p. 26

# Humanitarian Results

- Unemployment projected to hit 47 percent, and poverty to hit 74 percent
- PA Ministry of Health provides severely limited services, and UN and NGOs can replace only a fraction of PA Ministry of Health Service
  - Municipal services collapsing from non-payment of salaries: garbage collection has ceased in Gaza<sup>1</sup>
  - 1,726 public schools (affecting 750,000) in the Palestinian territories are closed because of the strike due to non-payment of salaries <sup>2</sup>
  - 70 per cent of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip cannot feed themselves without assistance, a 30 per cent increase in the number in just over a year <sup>3</sup>
- Violence inhibits humanitarian aid; more Israeli humanitarian abuses
  - International aid workers increasingly targeted by Israelis <sup>1</sup>
  - Increased and more severe internal movement restrictions imposed by Israelis<sup>1,4</sup>
  - UN cars becoming targets for car-jacking; UN compounds attacked/looted in Gaza; fields visits prevented; attempted hijacking of food deliveries by non-beneficiaries. <sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "World Food Programme Emergency Report 2006," WFP, September 8, 2006

<sup>2</sup> "Six months without pay sparks teachers' strike in Gaza and West Bank," UNICEF, September 5, 2006

<sup>3</sup> "70 per cent of Palestinians in Gaza need international food aid to survive," WFP, September 19, 2006

<sup>4</sup> "Twentieth Report, Implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access," United Nations, September 4, 2006

<sup>5</sup> "World Food Programme Emergency Report 2006," WFP, August 18, 2006

# Diplomatic Results

- PA turns away from the West, and is pushed to develop relations with less well-intentioned nations
- More regionalism – “constructive engagement” less possible
  - Favouritism shown President Abbas’ office is not unnoticed
  - Pro-West governments in Middle East finding it more difficult to “walk the line”
  - Events in the occupied Palestinian territories seen by West in the bizarre framework of Bush’s “war on terror”
- Diplomatic guideposts weakened
  - Diplomatic accords have less relevance now than they did in Spring, 2006

<sup>1</sup>“UN Palestine relief agency ready with rehabilitation once conditions improve,” UN Department of Public Information, September 7, 2006

<sup>2</sup>“West Bank and Gaza Update,” World Bank, September, 2006, p. 26



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# Overall PA Finance Situation

# Previous Revenue Streams received by the Palestinian Authority

- Prior to March, 2006, the PA had three major sources of funding:
  - “Clearance revenues” transferred from Israel, estimated at \$65 M (US) per month (Note: these revenues were established through the quasi-customs union between Israel and Palestine set up via the Oslo Accords)
  - Budget support from the international community, estimated at \$34 M per month,
  - Domestic revenues, estimated at \$35 M per month.

<b>Each month PA requires</b> (of which 60% is salaries to PA)	\$165 million
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#### In 2005 the PA received:

VAT and customs	\$60 million
Average donor payments	\$30 million
Internal other taxes	\$30 million

Note: The deficit of \$45 million was in part due to the increase of PA salaries announced in 2005.

# Timeline since April 2006 (1)

The Hamas-led government was elected on January 25, 2006. Key events since:

- January: Israel also imposes harsh trade restrictions on the Palestinian territories (“trade and labour restrictions” in World Bank terminology)
- February: Following election of Hamas in January, Israel illegally cuts off 50 percent of the PA’s revenue source: tax transfers established under Oslo
- March: PA unable to make transfer payments on its budget, so social programs (e.g. unemployment, retirement, etc.) cut drastically
- March: EU, US and Canada declared a cessation of aid payments to the PA
- April: PA loses access to banking services as banks refuse to process gifts from other countries in fear of punitive US measures

# Timeline since April 2006 (2)

Key events since (continued):

- June: The Quartet endorses a “Temporary International Mechanism” (TIM) to provide aid for certain specific needs (e.g. fuel, water treatment, medicine, etc.)
- July: Gifts from Arab countries are routed through President Abbas’ office, and a small lump-sum payment is made to PA employees
- July: Under the TIM, payments are made directly to bank accounts of health care workers
- August: On August 29, PA Ministry of Health staff go on strike for non-payment of salaries.
- September: PA employees begin a general strike on September 1. PA employees (supporting about 30% of the population) are unpaid since mid-March.
- September: EU implements additional aspects of the TIM.

# World Bank Predictions from March, 2006

The World Bank's Scenario 4 made the assumptions which track with unfolding events:

- Suspension of tax transfers from Israel
- Trade and Labor Restrictions imposed by Israel
- Reduced aid flows (both Israel and Western donors pressure the PA)
- The predicted result:
  - Real GDP per capita declines by 27 percent in 2006
  - Personal incomes decline by 30 percent in 2006
  - Unemployment hits 47 percent, and poverty 74 percent by 2008 (see next slide for WB updated figures)

Assumptions	2005 (est.)	Scenario 4		
		2006	2007	2008
Revenues transferred	740	100	0	0
Revenues withheld	0	422	503	507
Palestinian workers in ISI	44,800	22,700	13,400	7,400
Foreign assistance	1,300	1,100	1,000	900
Public consumption	1,514	1,071	1,071	1,071
Exports	590	506	547	585
Population (million)	3.51	3.63	3.76	3.88
Inflation (cpi, %)	3.5	2	2	2
<b>Outcomes</b>				
GDP	4,044	2,910	2,835	2,851
GDI	5,815	4,353	4,096	3,959
Private consumption	3,652	2,953	2,792	2,777
Investment	1,022	405	369	362
Imports	2,734	2,026	1,945	1,944
GDP per capita	1,152	802	754	735
GDI per capita	1,657	1,199	1,089	1,020
Real GDP growth	6.3	-24.5	-4.3	-1.0
Real GDP p.c. growth (%)	2.7	-27.1	-7.4	-4.2
Real GDI p.c. growth (%)	4.3	-30.0	-10.8	-8.3
Cumulative real GDP p.c. change since 1999	-30.6	-49.4	-53.2	-55.1
Unemployment (%)	23.4	39.6	44.3	47.0
Poverty (%)	44	67	72	74

Source: West Bank and Gaza, Economic Update and Potential Outlook, World Bank, March 15, 2006

# World Bank September, 2006 outlook for 2006 and beyond

The World Bank lists all of the following as contributing factors to the bleak growth/contraction figures:

- Suspension of tax transfers from Israel
- Reductions in donor assistance to Palestinians
- Reduction in number of Palestinians granted work permits in Israel
- Israeli restrictions in the movement of goods between the occupied Palestinian territories and their markets

## Macroeconomic Projections 2005-2008

	2005	2006	2007	2008
GDP (US\$ million)	4,044	2,910	2,835	2,851
real growth rate	6.3%	-24.5%	-4.3%	-1.0%
GDP per capita (US\$)	1,152	802	754	735
real growth rate	2.7%	-27.1%	-7.4%	-4.2%
GDI per capita (US\$)	1,657	1,199	1,089	1,020
real growth rate	4.3%	-30.0%	-10.8%	-8.3%
Unemployment Rate	23%	40%	44%	47%
Poverty Rate	44%	67%	72%	74%

*World Bank staff projections, March 2006. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measures productive activity within West Bank and Gaza; Gross Disposable Income (GDI) measures total income, including workers' remittances, foreign aid, and other current transfers.*

Source: "West Bank and Gaza Update," World Bank, September, 2006, p. 10

# Impacts via PA Salaries

- Since 2000, poverty rates increased from 22 percent to 44 percent
- Without PA salaries, poverty rates are expected to rise to 74 percent by 2008
- Over 150,000 people were/are employed by the PA, and their salaries support about 1 million people – roughly 25 percent of the population

Source: West Bank and Gaza, Economic Update and Potential Outlook, World Bank, March 15, 2006



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# **Aid developments and factors since Spring, 2006**

# The “Temporary International Mechanism”

- Seeks to “ensure direct delivery of assistance to the Palestinian people; it should be limited in scope and duration, and operate with full accountability and transparency.”
- Three thrusts:
  - Health Care
    - Finance essential supplies and approved recurrent non-wage expenditures
    - basic allowances to health care workers who have not been receiving salaries
  - Support for the uninterrupted supply of utilities, including fuel
  - Basic needs allowances to meet the essential needs of the poorest segments of the population

*“This operation will have to have the broadest international support...” - TIM*

# Payments under the TIM

- As of Sept. 1<sup>st</sup>, the EU has committed 330 M Euros to the TIM. To date, this had provided:
  - Medical supplies and running costs for 413 clinics and 22 hospitals
  - Improved access to water, health care, and sanitation by 1.3 M in Gaza, primarily through supply of fuel
  - 625,000 social payments in July (including to 11,500 MoH workers)
- Anticipated aid includes:
  - Another social payment in September to social cases and pensioners

# Israeli Restrictions to Movement (slide 1)

- Rafah crossing closed since June 25 for regular movement.<sup>1,2</sup>
  - Rafah is the sole crossing for Gazans who want to go abroad
  - Rafah crossing has been closed to traffic since 25 June 2006.
    - On 18-19 July, it was opened to allow the crossing of 5,178 Palestinian who had been stuck on the Egyptian side of the crossing
    - On 10, 11 August, Israel allowed selective departures (e.g. foreign nationals)
    - On August 19, Israel opened for 11 hours, during which 310 entered, and 2470 departed
    - On Sept. 22, for 4,000 to re-enter, and humanitarian cases to exit
- Karni crossing is the commercial link for Gaza<sup>1</sup>
  - A total of only 19.5 trucks of exported goods have been allowed to leave Gaza since June 23, 2006. (By comparison, 938 trucks carrying imported goods were allowed into Gaza during a two-week period in August)
  - Karni is open irregularly, and only handles commercial traffic

<sup>1</sup>"Twentieth Report, Implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access," United Nations, September 4, 2006

<sup>2</sup>"Gazans rush to cross border during opening," Reuters, September 22, 2006

# Israeli Restrictions to Movement (slide 2)

- Erez crossing remains closed for Palestinian workers and traders since March 12.<sup>1</sup>
  - Since June 25, only critical Palestinian humanitarian cases have been permitted to cross
- Kerem Shalom crossing has remained closed since June 25 (data available through Aug. 22)
- Sufa crossing has remained closed since June 25.

<sup>1</sup>“Twentieth Report, Implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access,” United Nations, September 4, 2006

# Israeli Restrictions to Movement (slide 3)

- European monitors to staff the Rafah crossing are housed in Ashkelon (Israel) and must use the Kerem Shalom crossing to get to their posts. Israel will often close Kerem Shalom, and *de facto* close Rafah without “officially” closing it. <sup>1</sup>
- EU monitors have considered abandoning their mandate, given their ineffectiveness. The EU is considering negotiating for an Egyptian residence for monitors
- Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA, signed in November) deadline for introduction of truck convoys between Gaza and West Bank was January 15. Deadline passed.
- On August 24th, UNRWA had to announce a cessation of operations as commercial deliveries had been prevented by Israel for seven days. Food distribution was disrupted, and fuel supplies for critical health care needs was dangerously low. Supplies for UNRWA schools were also blocked. <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>“Gazans rush to cross border during opening,” Reuters, September 22, 2006

<sup>2</sup>“Children Pay the Price as UNRWA Operations in Gaza are Grinding to a Halt,” UNRWA, August 24, 2006

# Collapsing Public Health Care & Education

Following the election of Hamas in January, 2006, the world sanctioned and isolated the Palestinian people economically. Six months later:

- PA Ministry of Health staff go on strike on August 29<sup>th</sup> <sup>1</sup>
  - *“We can't continue unless we get our salaries. We have been quiet six months and can't be quiet any longer.” MoH Senior Director in Nablus*
- World Health Organization (WHO) announces PA Ministry of Health (MoH) is near collapse.<sup>1</sup>
- Critical shortage of drugs and medical materials, in spite of direct donations made by different agencies. <sup>2</sup>
  - E.g. In Hebron, maternity wards are closed, 112 MoH primary health care centers, only emergency services for most severe cases are provided
  - E.g. In Hebron and Nablus, all MoH pharmacies are closed
- 1,726 public schools (affecting 750,000) in the Palestinian territories are closed because of the Ministry of Education strike due to non-payment of salaries <sup>3</sup>



November 20, 2005- The future is even bleaker for this boy, being searched by Israeli occupation forces in Hebron, West Bank, as his school did not open this Fall due to non-payment of salaries to teachers.

<sup>1</sup> “Palestinian Health Ministry in financial crisis,” WHO, September 1, 2006

<sup>2</sup> “The suspension of aid has led to a serious deterioration in access to health care for Palestinians,” Medecins sans frontieres, September 21, 2006

<sup>3</sup> “Six months without pay sparks teachers’ strike in Gaza and West Bank,” UNICEF, September 5, 2006



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# **Spring 2006 Predictions – Fall 2006 Reality**

# Other elements of the humanitarian situation in Gaza today...

- 70 percent of Gaza unable to cover their daily food needs without assistance <sup>1</sup>
- Only 30 percent of Gazans have a regular income <sup>2</sup>
- Most Gaza residents have power for only 6-8 hours per day <sup>2</sup>
- On average, there are six hours of water every two days <sup>2</sup>
- WFP increased its food aid to assist 220,000 from 160,000 (non-refugees), i.e. 50 percent of the non-refugee population <sup>2</sup>



*July, 2006 – A Palestinian girl tries to read by light of a gas lamp. An Israeli attack on Gaza's only electrical station on June 28<sup>th</sup> has left most of Gaza's population without electricity for most of the day. Such gratuitous attacks against civilian infrastructure violate international law.*

<sup>1</sup> "Humanitarian factsheet on Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian Territories," UN DPI, August 9, 2006

<sup>2</sup> "WFP operational update: occupied Palestinian territories," WFP, August 16, 2006

# Issues with trying to force aid entirely through new, non-PA channels

- The World Bank noted three important obstacles if all aid were redirected through international or Palestinian NGOs:
  1. Emergency/humanitarian assistance levels will ramp up much more slowly under new (and external) needs assessment processes
  2. Israeli border restrictions would be a severe and ongoing problem for international aid donors
  3. Aid to pay salaries for the PA have always been viewed as a useful type of welfare to the PA administration.
    - Some reports estimate that 1 in 4 Palestinians depends on a PA salary.
    - OCHA states that PA employees make up 37 percent of the workforce in Gaza, and 14 percent in the West Bank

Source: West Bank and Gaza, Economic Update and Potential Outlook, World Bank, March 15, 2006

# Issues with trying to force aid entirely through new, non-PA channels

1. Emergency/humanitarian assistance levels will ramp up much more slowly under new (and external) needs assessment processes:
  - The TIM, conceived in May, and leveraging two mechanisms already in place through the World Bank, is still unable to avert the strike of MoH workers in September
  - The TIM does nothing to address other essential humanitarian sectors (education, social security, unemployment, etc.)
  - The TIM is the only concrete alternative to giving aid money directly to the PA

Source: West Bank and Gaza, Economic Update and Potential Outlook, World Bank, March 15, 2006

# Issues with trying to force aid entirely through new, non-PA channels

2. Israeli border restrictions would be a severe and ongoing problem for international aid donors
  - See Israeli Restrictions to Movement above

Source: West Bank and Gaza, Economic Update and Potential Outlook, World Bank, March 15, 2006

# Issues with trying to force aid entirely through new, non-PA channels

3. Aid to pay salaries for the PA have always been viewed as a useful type of welfare to the PA administration
  - TIM does not address the overall penury of Palestinians, even if it does provide salaries to some
  - TIM also does not address the issue of rising lawlessness as security forces go unpaid

Source: West Bank and Gaza, Economic Update and Potential Outlook, World Bank, March 15, 2006

# Capacity Issues with trying to force aid through new, non-PA channels (slide 1)

- The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported:
  - “International humanitarian agencies do not have the capacity to take over the running of PA services, even if the security situation allowed.”
  - The PA employs 12,000 health sector employees (and 62 percent of all health care facilities) (wage bill of \$8.8 million / month)
    - The PA Ministry of Health runs 22 general hospitals, UNRWA runs one, and NGOs run 12 smaller, specialised hospitals.
    - Health care professional will start charging for their services, excluding many from care
    - Key public health programs would be gutted, including immunization and mother and child care programs
    - An informal health care economy would reduce care quality
  - The PA employs 39,000 in education, and runs 76 percent of all schools (wage bill of \$22.6 million / month)
    - School routines will break down: reduced hours, class size
    - Teacher morale would decline, drop-out rates would rise, quality would decline

Source: “Assessment of the future humanitarian risks in the occupied Palestinian territory,” April 11, 2006, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

# Issues with trying to force aid entirely through new, non-PA channels (slide 2)

- The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported:
  - The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (wage bill of \$1.3 million / month)
    - Humanitarian aid for unemployment and social hardship cases
    - Distributes 65 percent of all WFP (World Food Programme) food
  - PA pensions for those who have retired from the public sector (wage bill of \$5.2 million / month)
    - 9,800 Palestinians receive a pension
  - The PA also employs tens of thousands\* in law enforcement
    - Non-payment of law enforcement employees could trigger a rise in criminality, kidnapping and protection rackets


Source: "Assessment of the future humanitarian risks in the occupied Palestinian territory," April 11, 2006, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

# Summary Impacts of Financial Pressures

Assumptions	Scenario 1 – Current crisis and no abrupt change in PA funding	Scenario 2 – Current crisis plus limited erratic PA funding	Scenario 3 – Current crisis and no funds available for the PA
<b>Aid to the PA</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PA receives aid as in 2005 (approx. \$360ml)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The PA receives limited funding (approx. \$230m) from Arab countries and most Western funding is withdrawn<sup>2</sup></li> <li>Western donors identify alternative financing mechanisms separate from the PA.<sup>3</sup></li> <li>Donor contributions are delayed by banks' halting of transactions with the PA.</li> <li>The liquidation of PA assets and borrowing from banks is delayed.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All aid to the PA is halted</li> </ul>
<b>Clearance revenue transfers from Israel</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PA receives transfers as in 2005 (\$790m).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The GoI suspends the transfer of revenues which it collects on behalf of the PA – a contravention of the 1994 Paris Protocol.<sup>4</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As in Scenario 2</li> </ul>
<b>Insecurity</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Israeli security measures continue to intensify e.g., search and arrest campaigns, internal closures, incursions, artillery shelling.</li> <li>The firing of homemade rockets from the Gaza Strip to targets inside Israel continues.</li> <li>The threat of suicide attacks continues.</li> </ul>	<p>In addition to the trends mentioned in Scenario 1:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Violence from unpaid security staff possibly increases</li> <li>Security possibly restricts the ability of international workers and organisations to function</li> <li>Violence is expected to be directed at Israel.</li> </ul>	<p>In addition to the trends mentioned in Scenario 2:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The PA loses control of security.</li> <li>Privatised security is offered by armed groups.</li> </ul>
<b>Trade and labour restrictions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Internal closures remain tight and possibly rise</li> <li>Restrictions on access to closed areas (e.g. Jordan Valley, Seam zone, East Jerusalem) continue.</li> <li>The trisection of the West Bank is maintained</li> <li>Permit regime is further tightened</li> <li>Gaza's crossings to Israel are further limited</li> </ul>	<p>In addition to the trends mentioned in Scenario 1:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Restrictions on workers through Karni and Erez crossings between the Gaza Strip and Israel continue and possibly tighten.</li> <li>Movement from the West Bank to Israel and Jerusalem deteriorates esp. with the Barrier's completion and the continued reduction of worker permits.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As in Scenario 2</li> </ul>
<b>Investment in the domestic economy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The GDP does not experience the modest growth as in 2005 due to PA's unsustainable fiscal policy (down from 6.3 to 4.9%).</li> <li>Palestinian businesses are unable to market produce due to closures.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>GDP falls by 25%</li> <li>Local revenues decline to \$25m / month from \$35m.</li> <li>Entrepreneurs' savings are exhausted and private investors abroad turn away due to the uncertain environment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The economy slides into a collapse far worse than in Scenario 2.</li> </ul>

Source: West Bank and Gaza, Economic Update and Potential Outlook, World Bank, March 15, 2006


# Projected GDP Impacts



Data Source: 1999-2005 - IMF data, 2006-2008 projections World Bank.

# Projected Poverty Levels

Poor in the occupied Palestinian territory with projections under a Scenario 2 situation



Data Source: World Bank



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# **Canadian Aid to Palestine (Spring, 2006 findings)**

# Canadian Aid Programs

- CIDA estimates that between 1993 and 2004:
  - Canada allocated on average \$25 million a year for development initiatives in the West Bank and Gaza, focused on programs of
    - social development
    - Governance
    - civil society capacity building
    - refugees/peace-building
  - By the end of 2005, Canada's disbursements since the 1990s had reached a total of approximately \$333 million
- Despite repeated requests for clarifications from CIDA, CJPME has had trouble getting good detail on the existing Canadian aid programs for Palestine, as well as details on the impacts of planned changes
- Information is changing quickly – be prepared for potential changes

# Canadian Programs - suspended

Four operational projects (\$7.34 million over four years) are being suspended.

- Housing Rehabilitation and Policy Development (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, PA Ministry of Public Works and Housing and PA Ministry of Finance, \$6.3 million, 2005-08): to assist the PA in the field of housing both at the policy and operational levels.
- Refurbishment and Management of Ramallah Municipal Industrial Park (Federation of Canadian Municipalities, City of Ramallah, \$400,000, 2005-07): to assess the feasibility of assisting the Ramallah Municipality to refurbish and manage its industrial park.
- Middle East 4 Meeting (Justice Canada, \$600,000, 2005-06): to convene justice ministers from the PA, Israel, Jordan and Egypt to engage in an annual justice dialogue.
- English Language Training for Palestinian Security Officials (Canadian Foreign Affairs Department assistance to the PA, \$41,000)

# Canadian Programs – to be restructured (slide 1)

Canada is restructuring the following programs “assistance to the PA or its officials, or that entailed systematic engagement with the PA” on a “case-by-case basis to eliminate any PA involvement”:

- Judicial Independence and Human Dignity (University of Windsor, BirZeit University and the Palestinian High Judicial Council, \$4.5 million, 2005-09): which seeks to train Palestinian judges on issues such as judicial independence and human rights.
- Palestinian Municipal Management, Phase 2 (Federation of Canadian Municipalities, municipalities of Rafah and Khan Yunis, PA Ministry of Local Government, \$3.2 million, 2003-06): to improve the management capacity of municipalities and encourage citizens’ participation in municipal affairs.
- Education Capacity Building (UNICEF, \$5 million, 2005-06): to improve teaching methods across the West Bank and Gaza.
- Governance Capacity Project (managed by the Canadian Representative Office in Ramallah, \$417,000, 2005-08) which seeks to provide advice and support to CIDA and the PA for public sector reform.
- Child Friendly Cities (UNICEF, \$3.5 million, 2004-07): to improve local-level planning and services for children in six Palestinian cities.

# Canadian Programs – to be restructured (slide 2)

Canada is restructuring the following programs “assistance to the PA or its officials, or that entailed systematic engagement with the PA” on a “case-by-case basis to eliminate any PA involvement”:

- Child Wellbeing Phase 2 (Secretariat for the National Plan of Action for Palestinian Children, and the Ministry of Education, \$3 million, 2004-07): to improve coordination and services for children in the area of safe learning and play environment and psycho-social counseling.
- Technical & Vocational Training for Palestinian Women (World University Services of Canada, Alternatives, PA Ministry of Social Affairs, \$3.8 million, 2002-06): to empower low-income women to improve their economic conditions through the provision of training and other development initiatives.
- Middle East Capacity Building Fund (\$500,000, 2005-07): to respond rapidly to Palestinian development needs with Canadian technical expertise. No ongoing project activities at present.



*November 13, 2005- Palestinian children read stories at the English Reading Club, part of the al-Watan Center for Civic Education, Conflict Resolution and Nonviolence in the West Bank city of al-Khalil (Hebron)*

# Canadian Programs Continuing

A number of Canadian programs have not yet been identified for suspension or restructuring. They seem to be:

- UNRWA humanitarian support for Palestinian refugees, including support for microcredit, job creation and shelter rehabilitation (\$12 million, 2005-07), refugee camp upgrading (\$6.5 million, 2003-06), management reform (\$129,000, 2006), and refugee record systems development (\$1.2 million, 2004-08).
- Palestine Trade Centre (\$5 million, multi year): to support the private sector association of Palestinian exporters to compete internationally and access regional and global markets. Project remains at the planning stage.
- Provision of Border Management Expertise (\$500,000, 2005-07): A Canadian border management expert is deployed to the US Security Coordinator team.
- Expert Advisory Services Fund (International Development Research Centre, \$5 million, 2001-07): to support planning, policy development, research and dialogue on peace and refugee issues.
- Scholarship fund for Palestinian Refugee Women (International Development Research Centre, UNRWA, \$1.5 million, 2000-09): to support the professional development of Palestinian refugee women in Lebanon

# April 2006 Changes in Canadian Aid to West Bank and Gaza through C.I.D.A.

Project Title	Partner	Project Duration	Project Status	Millions of Dollars Canadian Committed
Response to the Consolidated Appeal Process	UNDP	2006-2007	Maybe affected	5
Housing Rehabilitation and Policy Development	CMHC	2005-2008	<b>Suspended</b>	6.3
Improving Living Conditions of Refugees	UNRWA	2005-2007	Maybe affected	1 or 19.829 **
Middle East 4 Meeting (ME 4)	Justice Canada	2005-2006	<b>Suspended</b>	0.6
<a href="#">Water Demand Initiative in the Middle East and North Africa</a>	Intl. Devel. Research Centre	2005-2010	Maybe affected	0.2 ***
<a href="#">Neighbourhood Corners Phase II</a>	Oxfam Quebec	2005-2007	Maybe affected	1.5
Annual Institutional Support to UNRWA	UNRWA	2005-2006	Maybe affected	Not available
<a href="#">Governance Capacity Project</a>	Cdn. Representative Office, Ramallah	2005-2006	<b>Being restructured</b>	0.4175
<a href="#">Palestinian Election Support Fund</a>	Cdn. Representative Office, Ramallah	2004-2006	Maybe affected	0.5
<a href="#">Middle East Good Governance Fund</a>	IRDC	2004-2009	Maybe affected	0.3 ***
<a href="#">Media capacity building initiative</a>	Institute for Media Policy and Civil Society	2004-2006	Maybe affected	0.05 ***
<a href="#">Support to Palestinian Elections</a>	UN Development, Program	2004-2006	<b>Being restructured</b>	1.2
<a href="#">Child well being Phase II</a>	Secretariat of the National Action Plan for Pal. Children	2004-2007	Maybe affected	3
<a href="#">UNICEF Child friendly cities</a>	UNICEF – New York	2004-2006	<b>Being restructured</b>	3.5
<a href="#">Reform support fund - Phase II</a>	DFAIT	2004-2006	Maybe affected	0.5
<a href="#">World Bank reform trust fund</a>	DFAIT	2004-2006	Maybe affected	0.5
<a href="#">Middle East program in civil society &amp; peace building II</a>	McGill U. Office of International Research	2003-2006	Maybe affected	

# April 2006 Changes in Canadian Aid to West Bank and Gaza through C.I.D.A.

Project Title	Partner	Project Duration	Project Status	Millions of Dollars Canadian Committed
<a href="#">Reform support fund - Phase I</a>	DFAIT	2003-2006	Maybe affected	0.5
<a href="#">Palestinian municipal management project - Phase II</a>	Federation of Canadian Municipalities	2002-2006	<b>Being restructured</b>	3.2
<a href="#">Expert and Advisory Services Fund - III</a>	International Development Research Centre	2001-2007	Maybe affected	3.5
Technical and <a href="#">Vocational Training for Palestinian Women</a>	Entraide universitaire mondiale du Canada WUSC	2001-2006	<b>Being restructured</b>	3.8
<a href="#">Palestinian Mortgage and Housing Corporation</a>	CMHC	1999-2007	Maybe affected	3
<a href="#">Networking for Peace</a>	Not available	1999-2006	Maybe affected	2.4
Refurbishment and Management of Ramallah Municipal Industrial Park	Canadian Federation of Municipalities	2005-2008	<b>Suspended</b>	0.4
English Language Training for Pal. Security Officials	DFAIT to PA	Not available	<b>Suspended</b>	0.041
Judicial Independence and Human Dignity	U. of Windsor, BirZeit U., and Pal. High Judicial Council	2005-2009	<b>Being restructured</b>	4.5
Education Capacity Building	UNICEF	2005-2006	<b>Being restructured</b>	5
Middle East Capacity Building Fund	Not available	2005-2007	<b>Being restructured</b>	0.5
Palestine Trade Centre	Not available	Multi year	Maybe affected	5
Provision of Border Management Expertise	US Security Management Team	2005-2007	Maybe affected	0.5
Expert Advisory Services Fund	International Development Research Centre	2001-2007	Maybe affected	5
Scholarship fund for Pal. Refugee Women	International Development Research Centre	2000-2009	Maybe affected	1.5
Assistance to the Pal. Coastal Police	DFAIT	2006-2008	<b>Not operationalized</b>	4.5

# April 2006 Changes in Canadian Aid to West Bank and Gaza through C.I.D.A.

Totals	Change	Millions of Canadian \$
	Suspended	9.741
	Not Operationalized	4.5
<b>Sub-total</b>		<b>14.241</b>
	Being restructured	22.1175
	Maybe affected	?
<b>Grand Total</b>		<b>?</b>

## Footnotes:

- This chart is based on the best information available at time of writing. Lack of access to Foreign Affairs and CIDA officials prevented resolution of inconsistencies between different pages on the CIDA site.
- \*\* The suspended project “Housing Rehabilitation and Policy Development” had a budget apparently stated to be either \$1 million or \$19.829 million depending on which page of the CIDA site is examined.
- \*\*\* These amounts represent the Palestinian portions of projects involving different recipient jurisdictions.
- Because of the incompleteness of the information available, no Grand Total of projects “suspended”, “not operationalized”, “being restructured” and “maybe affected” is possible here.
- The overall CIDA budget for aid to Palestine is not available.

## References:

CIDA Project Browser <http://les.acdi-cida.gc.gc.ca/servlet/JKMSearchController>

Canadian Aid Programs in the West Bank and Gaza [http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida\\_ind.nsf](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf)

West Bank and Gaza Overview <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/webcountry.nsf/VDUDocEn>



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# Moral and Legal Concerns with Aid

# Moral Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance

- UN organizations provide humanitarian assistance (HA) on the basis of three principles<sup>1</sup>:
  - Humanity
  - Neutrality
  - Impartiality
- Assistance is provided in order to “save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> UN GA Resolution 46/182 (1991)

<sup>2</sup> Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship, June, 2003

# Do Palestinians want Canada to overhaul the services delivery model of the PA?

International aid models are designed to support and bolster local authorities, not circumvent them\*:

- “To be effective, projects in the current [UN plan]... need to be implemented in coordination with local authorities”
- “Humanitarian interventions should not cause irreversible changes to the PA over time”
- “Baring a situation of collapse, humanitarian initiatives should not duplicate PA services.”



*Jenin area village: Three women from area villages were chosen and trained as health workers to run the clinic. Says its founder, Dr. Jamil Al-Hamad, “The clinic succeeded because of our determination, and because there is a genuine need for it among the people.”*

\* “Assessment of the future humanitarian risks in the occupied Palestinian territory,” April 11, 2006, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

# Moral Guidelines for Aid-giving

The UN allocates assistance on the basis of clear criteria guiding humanitarian interventions, including<sup>2</sup>:

- Principle of Impartiality:  
I.e. Humanitarian assistance should be guided by need rather than political requirements according to the principle of impartiality.
- Principle of Neutrality:  
I.e. Humanitarian assistance is neutral, and humanitarian agencies should interact with all parties to ensure access and to negotiate conditions for delivery. Humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the host authority.
- Principle of Humanity:  
E.g. Humanitarian intervention should be expanded to address the impact of increasing poverty and unemployment – for example, through employment generation and the provision of credit, so as to target the poorest and stimulate the local economy.

<sup>1</sup> " Hamas Gov't Seeks Mideast Mediator Talks," Associated Press, March 27, 2006

<sup>2</sup> "Assessment of the future humanitarian risks in the occupied Palestinian territory," April 11, 2006, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)



Ama'ri Refugee Camp in Ramallah: A young Palestinian gets his eyes tested in the local health center

## **Reminder (The PA has invited int'l donors to audit aid spending):**

- "Our government will provide all mechanisms for all donors to monitor the spending of the money and to be sure it will be spent the right way. Any state providing a penny – we have no problem for it to come and monitor the spending."<sup>1</sup>

- PA PM Ismail Haniyeh, March 27, 2006

# What about International Law?

- The Fourth Geneva Convention applies specifically during times of war and occupation.
- It's applicability to Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories is questioned by none but Israel:

*“Under the Fourth Geneva Conventions, Israel as the occupying power bears the responsibility for the welfare of the Palestinian population. In recent years, international donors and the Palestinian Authority have in practical terms taken on this role. If the PA is unable to provide basic services to the Palestinian population and donors withhold assistance, the emphasis will shift back to Israel to resume its legal obligation.” \**

\* “Assessment of the future humanitarian risks in the occupied Palestinian territory,” April 11, 2006, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

# CJPME Recommendation 3:

## CJPME believes

- Canada's stance on aid to the PA is not moral, appropriate, or rational
- Canada's stance on aid undermines its stated long term vision for the region

## Recommendation

- Canada should provide aid according to international norms of impartiality, neutrality & humanity, among others
- Canada should re-instate any impacted programs, as they serve both Canada's and Palestine's long-term objectives

# Applicability of International Humanitarian Law: Fourth Geneva Conventions (slide 1)

The Fourth Geneva Conventions make Israel – as the occupying power – responsible to ensure that the humanitarian needs of the civilian population are met:

- Article 55 – Ensuring adequate food and medical supplies  
“...the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the [occupied civilian] population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.”
- Article 56 – Ensuring the functioning of medical institutions  
“To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory, with particular reference to the adoption and application of the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to combat the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics. Medical personnel of all categories shall be allowed to carry out their duties.”

# Applicability of International Humanitarian Law: Fourth Geneva Conventions (slide 2)

The Fourth Geneva Conventions makes Israel – as the occupying power – responsible to ensure that the humanitarian needs of the civilian population are met:

- Article 23 – Expediting of relief supplies

“Each... party shall allow the free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores... intended only for civilians of another High Contracting Party, even if the latter is its adversary. It shall likewise permit the free passage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases.”

- Article 50 – Ensuring the functioning of educational institutions

The Occupying Power shall, with the cooperation of the national and local authorities, facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children.

- *“Even though Israel unilaterally withdrew its troops and settlements from Gaza in 2005, it continues to have obligations as an occupying power in Gaza under the Fourth Geneva Convention because of its almost complete control over Gaza’s borders, sea and air space, tax revenue, utilities, population registry, and the internal economy of Gaza. At a minimum, Israel continues to be responsible for the basic welfare of the Palestinian population in Gaza.” – Human Rights Watch, July 6, 2006*



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# End of Module